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Abstract— The goal of secure software engineering is to 
create software that keeps performing as intended even when 
exposed to attacks. Threat modeling is considered to be a key 
activity, but can be challenging to perform for developers, and 
even more so in agile software development. Hence, threat 
modeling has not seen widespread use in agile software projects. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the challenges facing 
adoption of threat modeling using the Microsoft approach with 
STRIDE. We performed a case study in a company comprising 
five agile development projects. We identified 21 challenges to 
threat modeling that emerged from our observations. We then 
mapped these challenges to  challenges found in the literature. 
Some challenges overlap the findings from the literature; the 
extra challenges we have found in our exploratory study came 
mostly from the activities of asset identification and also from 
our observations on what happened after the threat modeling 
meetings. This study shows that we still have to address many 
challenges in order to get a proper adoption of threat modeling 
in agile development projects. 
Keywords—STRIDE, Agile Software Development, Threat 
Modeling, Software Security, Secure Software Engineering  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of secure software engineering is to create 
software that keeps performing as intended even when 
exposed to attacks. This is more than just resilience; "as 
intended" also includes maintaining required levels of 
confidentiality and integrity, not just availability. Threat 
modeling is considered to be a key activity in achieving this 
goal. The main purpose of threat modeling is to identify and 
mitigate potential risks by means of eliciting or refining 
security requirements. Threat modeling is a process by which 
potential threats (such as structural vulnerabilities) can be 
identified, enumerated, and prioritized, simulating an 
attacker’s perspective. Such activities often take place in the 
design phase, and are repeated later on during the product life-
cycle, if necessary.  
The threat modeling activity is particularly important in 
software security, since many security vulnerabilities are 
caused due to architectural design flaws [1]. Furthermore, 
fixing such vulnerabilities after implementation may be very 
costly, requiring workarounds which sometimes increase the 
attack surface. A well-defined threat model helps to identify 
threats to different assets of a system by utilizing well-
grounded assumptions on the capabilities of any attacker 
interested in exploiting such a system. It also enables the 
development teams to identify critical areas of the design 
which need to be protected, as well as mitigation strategies. 
However, threat modeling can also be challenging to perform 
for developers, and even more so in agile software 
development.  
Various threat modeling approaches and methodologies 
have been developed over time and they have been used in the 
process of designing secure applications, varying from 
conceptual frameworks to practical methodologies [2]–[4]. In 
a recent systematic review, Tuma et al. [2] highlight that the 
existing threat modeling techniques have insufficient quality 
assurance of the outcomes, use merely validation by 
illustration to evaluate their proposed technique, and in 
addition most approaches do not provide tool support.   
In agile software development, adoption of  security 
practices poses different challenges, often because security 
activities are not prioritized, or because the practitioners are 
not able to see the relevance and importance of the activities 
to the improvement of the security in the project [5]. The same 
holds true for threat modeling; the practice is not widespread, 
and the agile practitioners have few sources of 
recommendations on how to proceed to adopt the practice in 
their development process [6]–[9]. Researchers have not yet 
gathered enough evidence on how to include threat modeling 
in software development processes that do not rely on having 
up-front design for their solutions. Studies in software security 
usually focus on software security activities in general, and 
there are few empirical studies focusing on specific practices 
in agile software development. 
This research aims to build evidence on the adoption of 
threat modeling using the Microsoft Threat Modeling 
Technique with STRIDE in agile projects; focusing on the 
challenges and experiences of different projects in one 
company where we have been facilitating the adoption of 
threat modeling in agile software development. This study is 
part of a research project which investigates how to 
meaningfully integrate software security into agile software 
development activities. The project started in October 2015 
and will end in October 2020. The company of our case study 
is a company with which we have had long-term collaboration 
in multiple projects since 2013.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:  In 
Section II we discuss  related work, and Section III covers the 
methodology and context of our study. In section IV we 
present the results with the mapping to the related work. In 
section V we discuss our results by stating the implications to 
research and practice. In Section VI we describe some 
  
limitations of our study, and section VII contains the 
conclusions and future work.   
II. BACKGROUND 
 Threat modeling is used to identify threats which may be 
related to specific vulnerabilities. If it is not feasible to remove 
the vulnerabilities,  additional security controls that prevent 
those vulnerabilities from being exploited must be added.  
There are various research papers that explore threat 
modeling in different domains [10]–[17]. Tuma et al. [2] 
recently conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) of the 
existing techniques for threat modeling. In their study they 
analyzed 38 primary studies where a total of 26 techniques 
were compared with respect to their applicability, 
characteristics of the required input for analysis, 
characteristics of analysis procedure, characteristics of 
analysis outcomes, and ease of adoption. The most commonly 
used techniques in the presented body of knowledge were 
misuse cases, attack trees, problem frames and several 
software-centric approaches that are well recognized in the 
software engineering community, particularly in the industrial 
space, such as STRIDE [18], [19], CORAS [20], and 
P.A.S.T.A [21]. The most frequently used technique in 
industry is STRIDE [22].  
Traditionally, threat modeling activities are coupled to the 
different phases of the waterfall workflow, starting with a 
global view of the ultimate upfront design. In contrast, agile is 
much more incremental, and service-oriented development 
lacks centralized control. Several proposals have appeared 
over the years on how to integrate security engineering 
practices into agile methodologies like Scrum and XP [23], 
built on the common premise that agile teams neglect security 
because it is not an explicit part of common agile frameworks. 
Poller et al. [24] suggest that Scrum works well as a 
management model, and security development requires 
iterations as in agile development, yet Scrum teams can fail to 
address security needs due to their low visibility, competing 
objectives, and Scrum’s division of labor. 
Türpe and Poller [23] theorize about tensions between the 
characteristics of security requirements and security work on 
the one hand, and the way Scrum manages development work 
on the other. Analyzing the definition of Scrum, the authors 
find three different ways of managing security work: as bug 
fixing on demand, continuously as a quality requirement 
through the definition of “done,” or as prioritized and planned 
development work through the product backlog. The authors 
discuss the capabilities and limitations of these approaches 
and find each of them inadequate. On-demand fixing rarely 
leads to substantial security improvement. As a quality 
requirement, security has a complex relationship with 
development work and is difficult to verify. Security features 
in the backlog would be a suitable approach to many security 
concerns, but they compete with other requirements and may 
also need special expertise to design and implement 
effectively. Türpe and Poller also argue that research aiming 
to reconcile security engineering with agile development 
should consider not only the execution of security activities in 
an agile process, but also the challenges of managing security 
work in agile frameworks. Their analysis suggests four areas 
of security tasks that are worth investigating and supporting: 
the reflective discovery of security needs to create backlog 
items, the valuation and prioritization of security work, agile 
verification and feedback in the security dimension, and the 
collaboration of Scrum teams with external security experts 
and consultants.  
Gálvez and Gürses [25] analyze which challenges and 
opportunities the shifts in software engineering practice 
introduce into traditional Threat Modeling activities; how they 
relate to the different Privacy Goals; and which Agile 
principles and Service properties have an impact on them.  The 
authors mention that the following principles from the agile 
manifesto are relevant to the threat modeling process [25]: 
1) The system design must be flexible enough to accom- 
modate new requirements anytime. Software will be de- 
veloped iteratively, implementing new requirements in 
each sprint while maintaining existing functionality. 
2) Working software should be delivered frequently. Cus- 
tomer needs are assumed to evolve through the use of 
systems. Frequent delivery allows developers to address 
them in fixed-timed iterations where priorities are set 
based on feedback from the customer. 
3) To transfer knowledge and convey critical information, 
developers should prioritize face-to-face meetings rather 
than read-only documentation. This preference for oral 
communications is expected to enhance the global 
understanding of the system and diminish the need for 
detailed diagrams and exhaustive reports. 
4) Working software is the primary measure of progress, and 
Test Driven Development enables developers to show 
what is already done, and third parties to check that it is 
done correctly. Together with face-to-face meetings, 
working software has been shown to be a more effective 
vehicle of communication than written documentation. 
Gálvez and Gürses [25] presented a list of 21 challenges 
and opportunities that the shifts in software engineering 
practice introduce into traditional Threat Modeling activities 
(as shown in Table 2); how they relate to the different Privacy 
Goals; and what Agile principles and Service properties have 
an impact on them.  
Tuma et al. [2] provide insight into the obstacles for 
adopting the existing approaches, and discuss the current state 
of their adoption in software engineering trends (e.g. Agile, 
DevOps). For them, there are four important aspects where 
existing threat modeling techniques have yet to mature: (i) 
traceability of analysis in the code base; (ii) composability of 
analysis outcomes; (iii) threat impact analysis automation; and 
(iv) definition of done [2]: 
• T1 - There is a need for highly automated threat modeling 
techniques due to short sprints. In the space of threat 
approaches, tools have been used for three main purposes: 
i) partially automating the analysis procedure, ii) 
graphically representing threats to the system and (iii) 
facilitating the analysis execution (i.e. helping the analyst 
to follow the procedure). 
• T2 - It is important that the information that was gained 
from threat modeling is automatically propagated to 
source code level (and vice-versa);  
• T3 - The existing techniques would benefit from 
guidelines of how to compose the analysis outcome, since 
the software systems under analysis in practice are too 
large and complex to be analyzed all at once; the analysis 
performed for one subsystem is related to security 
assumptions which may not be in line with the security 
assumptions of another subsystem.  
  
• T4 - Analysts are also faced with the challenge of deciding 
how many identified threats (and at what level of 
abstraction) are enough for a “good” analysis of a 
particular subsystem.  
Finally, as part of our previous work, Tøndel et al. [4] have 
performed a case study in a university setting comprising 
several agile development projects to learn more about 
challenges facing adoption of the threat modeling game 
Microsoft Elevation of Privilege (EoP). On the adoption of 
EoP in Agile, the authors concluded that EoP has the potential 
to improve security interest and awareness of the team 
participants, and can be useful for training in threat modeling; 
the system needs to be complex enough to have a ROI of the 
effort; there is a need to make the game more fun and engaging 
if it is to be used by agile teams; there is still an open question 
on when and how often to play or model (once that playing 
EoP in every sprint does not seem to be an option, as this 
would take quite a lot of time from each sprint); and, there is 
a need for an additional process to pick the key issues (risks, 
bugs, improvements) to address in the project after playing 
EoP. Additionally, a similar study was done on the risk 
estimation game Protection Poker (PP) [26]. PP includes 
activities on assets that are relevant for threat modeling, and it 
was found that identifying and prioritizing assets was 
considered useful by the teams, however challenges included 
the time it took, how to know if the granularity of assets is 
right, to know how to assess an asset's value and 
understanding the difference between asset value and 
exposure of a feature. 
In this work we will base the analysis of our observations 
in the conceptual framework established by the previous 
literature [2], [25] and our previous work [4], [26] building 
evidence for some of the theoretical propositions of the 
previous work.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Context  
This study is part of a bigger project1 which investigates 
how to meaningfully integrate software security into agile 
software development activities. The project started in 
October 2015 and will end in October 2020. The company of 
our case study is one which we have had long-term 
collaboration with since 2013. The method of choice for the 
project is Action Research [27], which is an appropriate 
research methodology for this investigation because of the 
combination of scientific and practical objectives that aligns 
with the basic tenet of action research, which is to merge 
theory and practice in a way such that real-world problems are 
solved by theoretically informed actions in collaboration 
between researchers and practitioners [27]. Canonical Action 
research is one of the many forms of action research [28], it is 
iterative, rigorous and collaborative, involving focus on both 
organizational development and the generation of knowledge. 
We apply canonical action research in this project [29]. 
Our study is based on an agile software organization 
spread over three different geographical locations. The 
company is a small/medium size organization with less than 
100 employees in Norway, Poland, and Finland. There are 
mainly 5 product teams in this organization. They provide 
                                                        
1 http://www.sintef.no/sos-agile 
2 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_Champions 
applications for fleet management, real time transport 
information systems and travel planning and ticketing 
systems. The solutions are complex in the sense that they 
involve hardware and software integrated solutions, as well as 
mobile and web applications.  
Furthermore, action research involves intervention. As a 
result of our collaboration, the company has introduced the 
role of Security Champion 2  in each team, these are team 
members that are more focused on security aspects than the 
other team members. Security Champions facilitate and 
sometimes coach the security activities in the team. The 
Security Champion is not necessarily a security expert, but a 
developer/architect with an above average interest and 
aptitude for security. This role is similar to what McGraw 
refers to as "the Satellite" in the BSIMM3. The company has 
also a professional that is named Security Officer, and her 
main responsibilities are to provide leadership and guidance 
to the teams on the approach to adopt security activities in the 
teams and to perform oversight on the activities that are 
needed for assurance that the security is addressed properly in 
the company. The introduction of the threat modelling as part 
of the Software Development Life Cycle was also another 
intervention, as described below.  
B. Our Approach to Threat Modeling in the Intervention 
At the companies where we are doing threat modeling, we 
follow the strategy based on the Microsoft Threat Modeling 
framework [18]. We have found that it provides a structured, 
systematic approach to threat modeling, which may also 
explain why it is the most frequently used approach in 
Norwegian companies and elsewhere [22]. In our instantiation 
of the approach, a threat model is a visual representation of 
four main elements: Assets which are essential or critical for 
the system; a description of how assets are stored, processed 
or otherwise interact with the system (usually described as a 
Data Flow Diagram); the attack surface of the system; threats 
which will affect one or more of  the identified assets.  
Asset identification is the first step. An asset is something 
that needs to be protected within the system. Usually, assets 
are the information or services that are vital for the business 
operation and success, however, the concept of “assets” can 
also comprise other parts of the system, such as hardware, 
network components, domains or even people. Asset 
identification is often assumed to be done implicitly, but we 
have formulated an explicit method [3] which we have since 
evolved. Briefly, developers and the most important system 
stakeholders perform a semi-structured brainstorming session, 
to get all possible assets on the board. We then engage the 
participants in an interactive classification session where we 
aim to determine the assets’ relative importance or value. 
Based on the developers’ knowledge of the system, we finally 
ask the participants to determine the assets’ relative ease of 
exploitation, and end up with a grid. After the meetings the 
team members were asked to annotate the asset list with more 
information about each asset.  
The second step in the threat modeling exercise is to get 
an overview over where the assets are stored, processed or 
otherwise interact with the system. As part of this step, it is 
also useful to define the interfaces of the system under 
analysis and to identify potential attack surfaces. As a means 
3 https://www.bsimm.com 
  
to get an overview of the system, we recommend making a 
Data Flow Diagram (DFD). A DFD is a graphical 
representation of the most important actors, processes, 
services, components and data stored in the system; 
highlighting how information flows between each of them. 
The most frequently used tool for drawing DFDs is the 
Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool (TMT), which implicitly also 
makes it the most popular threat modeling tool; TMT 
encompasses all aspects of security to offer documentation as 
a guide through the remaining process. The attack surface is 
identified directly from the DFD by looking at the trust 
boundaries between the system and external entities.  
The last step in the threat modeling exercise is to identify 
and analyze all relevant threats to the system. This can be done 
in several ways, but we performed it using the STRIDE 
framework [18]. 
STRIDE was used to identify threats by analyzing each of 
the interfaces defined in the DFD and assessing whether any 
of the attack types were relevant. Relevant attack types were 
studied further to determine how they could be executed or 
applied directly on the identified assets. STRIDE is based on 
the first letter of each of the attack types [18]:  
• Spoofing is forging a sender identity or attempting to 
access a system by using a false identity. 
• Tampering is the unauthorized modification of data. 
• Repudiation is the ability of users (legitimate or otherwise) 
to deny that they performed specific actions or 
transactions. 
• Information disclosure is the unwanted exposure of 
private data. 
• Denial of service is the process of making a system or 
application unavailable. 
• Elevation of privilege occurs when a user with limited 
privileges exploits system weaknesses to gain privileged 
access to an asset. 
After the meetings we asked the Security Champions to 
create a list of risks based on the threats that were identified in 
the meeting.  
C. Data Collection and data analysis 
In the study presented in this paper, our aim was to 
investigate how to apply threat modeling in agile projects, and 
our focus was on the challenges the teams are facing. Our 
research questions are: 
• What are the main challenges to applying threat modeling 
in agile software development? 
• How can we adapt the approach to better suit agile 
software development projects? 
To answer our research questions, we observed eight 
threat modeling sessions, each lasting typically 1-2 hours. The 
data collection was the observations after each session, and 
periodic discussion meetings. One of the authors conducted 
systematic meetings with the security champions every other 
week for 6 months, about different aspects of the job as 
Security Champion. It should be noted that for these teams this 
was the first time they were performing threat modeling, and 
some teams had to run more than one session to cover all parts 
of the DFD. Our observation template is reproduced in Fig.2. 
                                                        
4 https://www.maxqda.com/ 
We have also talked with the participants of the meetings 
during informal talks and bi-weekly discussions with the 
security champions of each team. Besides the observation 
files, we have also the following artefacts as results of the 
sessions:  
• Updated data flow diagrams; 
• Updated asset lists with prioritization;  
• A list of threats based on STRIDE per covered asset; 
• List of risks created from the sessions; 
We coded the observations using the MaxQDA 4 
qualitative data analysis tool, in an exploratory way so we 
could see which theme would emerge from the observations 
only. We first started generating the initial codes from the 
participants' quotes with the support of MaxQDA. After that 
we searched for themes among codes. Once themes were 
identified and listed, we grouped them by phases (preparation, 
execution and post-execution), having a total of 21 general 
main challenges encountered. We then classified these issues 
according to the challenges and, finally, the researchers 
interpreted and discussed the findings together in order to 
reach consensus.  
We describe below the observations from each of the 
phases of the process: asset identification, creating the DFD, 
running the threat modeling meeting with STRIDE, and after 
the meeting. We then make an comparison with the challenges 
found by Gálvez and Gürses [25] to confirm or refute the 
challenges they have elicited. 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the 21 challenges to threat modeling that 
emerged from our observations. In Table 1 we do a mapping 
of the challenges from Gálvez and Gürses [25] and Tuma et 
al.[2] to what we have observed, showing if we have raised 
similar challenges or not, or if we have found contradictory 
results. We do not aim to compare, but try to find a mapping 
of the challenges (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
Fig. 1 - Observation Template 
  
Step # Challenge Our Observations from Our case Study Mapping 
to 
[25],[2]  
Asset 
Identification 
C1 Documentation of the 
assets after the meeting was 
not done. 
We asked the teams to document the assets after the meetings, but most of the 
teams did not do this. When asking the teams afterwards, they mentioned that 
they did not see how this documentation would be useful. They thought that 
having the list of assets only with names and the prioritization and the 
discussion of the prioritization was good enough.  
T1 
C2 Many discussions on 
threats and mitigations 
strategies get lost 
It was very good to have the graph so people could discuss the exploitability 
of the assets, but at the same time at the meeting the team gets to discuss what 
are the mechanisms that they have to protect the assets, but once that the focus 
is on the assets, all this discussion gets lost. 
T1 
Data Flow  
Diagrams 
(DFDs) 
C3 It is challenging to motivate 
the teams to draw the 
diagrams 
Some security Champions did not feel motivated to write down the DFDs 
because they felt it was overwhelming and hard to have a good drawing of the 
design of the systems. Some teams spent a long time (more than 10 hours) 
creating the DFD and they mentioned it felt like a they were taking time from 
“development activities” that then impacted their productivity of “functionality 
output”. 
 
C4 It was hard to decide the 
right level of abstraction to 
the DFDs. 
In some teams the DFD was too high level, which impacted the discussions, 
sometimes we had to draw a deeper view of the DFD during the meeting,  
leading to less effective meetings. We noticed that if the DFD is too 
complex, then there is a need for many meetings to cover the DFD. If the 
DFD is too simple, then the discussion gets unfocused and vague. 
G2, T3 
C5 It takes long time to draw 
the diagrams 
In most of the teams, the security champion was the one documenting the 
diagrams, but they needed input from different people in the team. Some teams 
spent many hours trying to draw a good DFD. 
T1 
C6 It was challenging to map 
the interfaces with other 
teams 
Some teams had problems with drawing the interfaces with other internal 
systems in the company because they are a company focused on product 
development teams, but have projects that comprise many products. They were 
also not sure how to deal with cross-cutting concerns. It was not easy to get all 
teams in the same meeting, or to know who to invite from the different teams 
to the discussion. 
G3, T3 
C7 The approach does not 
make a link with the actual 
code 
The teams mentioned that they actually did not know how the system was 
really implemented, and the DFDs did not give that confidence that the system 
was actually implemented that way, especially where there was a lot of legacy 
code.  
G4, T2 
C8 It is challenging to 
maintain the DFDs. 
Because of the lack of focus on documentation in agile teams, the teams did 
not have a list of assets or a DFD of the system ready, and we had to ask them 
to create these artefacts for the meeting, and they did not show motivation to 
maintain or have set a strategy to update the DFD. The teams did not feel like 
this was an activity that they would want to do frequently. The main impression 
was that they would do it now, and then maybe in one year or something. It 
was not easy for the teams to foresee how often they would need to perform a 
new threat modeling for their systems. We as researchers also had problems to 
state clearly how to decide. 
G1 
Modeling 
Meeting 
C9 The meeting needs to be 
structured but it is not 
always clear on how to run 
the meeting. 
We tried different approaches to perform the meeting: based on covering the 
DFD; based on covering STRIDE; or ad-hoc based on where people thought 
the focus of the meeting should be. Sometimes we changed the approach as we 
saw it was not working well with a specific team. We still do not have clear 
recommendations on how to choose an strategy for the meeting.   
T1 
C10 It is hard to decide which 
other people should be 
included in the meetings 
besides the “core” 
development team. 
Specifically when trying to do the threat modeling across products, it was not 
easy to identify who should be the representative from each product. We also 
had some questions on whether or not we should include the Product Owners 
in the meetings. One product owner was very helpful in the meeting, but at the 
same time made the discussion very focused on his view of the system and the 
other team members did not participate as much. We noticed that for STRIDE 
types of discussions it was very beneficial to have the operations representative 
in the meeting.  
G3 
C11 There are challenges on 
cross-products modeling 
We created a meeting that we named “Cross Products Threat Modeling” to try 
to identify problems that one product could create for another product. We had 
many challenges with that meeting: to structure, to define which model to use 
for the analysis, to motivate people to be in the meeting and to decide who 
should be in the meeting. This is one issue that we have not found a satisfactory 
solution for. 
G16, T3 
  
Table 1 - Challenges identified in this Case Study 
C12 There are challenges with 
running meetings in 
distributed settings. 
Distributed teams are used to using video conferencing to replace or 
complement physical meetings, but we have found that this is challenging 
when doing threat modeling: there are still some technical challenges with the 
videoconferencing  equipment; it is generally not possible to see the people at  
all location(s) and their whiteboard(s) at the same time, and often not even the 
whole whiteboard at a resolution that allows everyone to read everything. We 
have experimented with different configurations, but the major challenges 
remain unresolved. We have tried making identical drawings at each 
participating site, but consistency is hard. When doing asset analysis we have 
tried writing notes and diagrams locally, letting remote participants provide 
input verbally, and we tried doing it the other way around, but there seems to 
be drawbacks with both solutions. 
 
C13 It is hard to know when 
enough analysis has been 
done. 
Because there always is the sense of “ongoing” project with agile, it is hard to 
explicitly say, "now it is good enough for the time being". It is also hard to say 
for how long this analysis is valid. One Product Owner mentioned that this is  
"useful rehearsal which should be done regularly in all projects". Another 
participant also mentioned that “It helps to document the mitigation strategies 
that are in people's head, but at the same time, it is hard to know if we have 
extracted all knowlegde needed.” As mentioned before, covering the whole 
DFD will often take too long; in some cases people get bored of the meetings; 
they feel like they have to follow up first the risks and threats elicited before 
discussing more about threats in a new meeting; at the same time it is not so 
straightforward to create a list of actionable items from the meetings. 
G5, T4 
C14 The meetings are not 
effective 
To agile teams, 1-2 hour meetings means a long time taken from the sprint 
hours. Furthermore, when they saw that they did not cover the full DFDs, the 
team members got somehow frustrated with the process. The coverage of the 
DFDs per meeting was much lower than we expected. We could not run the 
meetings with the teams indefinitely, so we decided to stop after two or three 
sessions with each team. 
G13, T1 
C15 There is a need for a 
Security Expert to run the 
meeting; not every team 
has this professional 
available 
Most agile teams nowadays do not have a “security expert” and this is a 
challenge. In our case study, the second author was the one running the 
meetings, and the other researchers doing observations. The security expert 
helps to facilitate and to leverage the discussion. The security champion was 
most of the times documenting the threats.  
Contradict 
G10 
C16 It is not easy to have 
everyone participating 
In some meetings, if there is someone that is more “expert”, “more 
experienced” or “more knowledgeable” in the project, he may take over the 
discussion, and the participation of the others diminishes. There is also the 
problem that not every one is expert in all parts of the DFDs, then in some 
meetings some people are not able to participate.   
 
STRIDE C17 STRIDE focuses too much 
on the “communication 
channels” 
We noticed that many times that STRIDE was limiting the discussion to the 
trust boundaries and the communication channels, thereby neglecting potential 
threats relevant to other parts of the product. 
G12 
Outputs from 
the Sessions 
C18 The output of the sessions 
are a list of concerns/ 
threats that are not 
concrete 
As a follow up, we asked the Security Champions from each team to formalize 
the threats discussed in the meetings as risks. The Security Champions did not 
feel completely confortable to write them down, and sometimes we needed to 
ask them many times about it. The meeting also did not focus much on the 
decision of impact and probability of the threats or on which mitigation actions 
would be done, because it would take too long. This was a follow-up that the 
Security Officer had to do with the security champions. We also asked the team 
to contribute to the documentation of the threats, but most teams did not 
prioritize this.  
 
C19 Followup of the threats is 
challenging 
As mentioned in C18, we had a challenge to make the  security champions  
follow up and describe the threats more in detail after the meeting was done.   
 
C20 The list of threats creates a 
concern on time. 
The team members were not sure when they would have time to prioritize 
threats from the parts of the product that they thought had passed the 
“definition of done”. 
 
C21 Not finding threats gives a 
false sense of security 
When the team had a very good design upfront and all the security issues were 
thought through in a good design it gives then a sense that the product is secure 
enough, and that they thus do not need to worry about security. 
 
  
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Implications to Research  
The study reported in this paper provides evidence on 
challenges that agile teams face when conducting threat 
modeling meetings in a software company with five different 
teams. Coincidentally, both our study and the study by Gálvez 
and Gürses identified 21 challenges each, with some overlap 
(as seen in Table 2). We could observe 9 of their 21 challenges 
(G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G12, G13, G15, G16). The extra 
challenges we have observed in our exploratory study came 
mostly from the activities of asset identification and also from 
our observations on what happened after the threat modeling 
meetings. 
It was surprising to us that Galvez and Gürses observed 
that bringing experts into the development process slows it 
down (G10), because in our case the security expert helped to 
facilitate the process. It is important to note that the agile 
teams we followed did not have a security expert prior to our 
intervention. Also, the expert helped to drive the dicussions 
where there was bigger probability of finding threats to the 
systems. Further research is needed to study the effect of the 
security expert on the threat modelling process. 
For different reasons, we were not able to observe nine of 
the challenges (G6, G7, G8, G11, G17, G18, G19, G20, G21): 
• G6 (Threats can emerge, change or vanish as the system 
evolves) and G17 (Strategic mitigations are difficult to 
spot in an evolving system): we did not observe these 
phenomena in the teams because we did not observe what 
happens over a longer period;  
• G7 (Requirements elicitation from customers is slow): in 
our context the threat modeling was performed during 
maintenance phase of the products;  
• G8 (Customers may not possess enough privacy 
knowledge), G11 (Business goals are difficult to translate 
to privacy requirements) and G18 (Conflicting privacy 
requirements for the same service): we did not focus on 
privacy, and, in our meetings the customers were not 
involved;  
• G19 (No common infrastructure to enforce rules across 
different services), G20 (Lack of information to automate 
testing) and G21(Manual validation requires expertise 
and documentation) were not the focus of our analysis. 
Our study also confirms all the challenges found by Tuma 
et al.. Some challenges we found overlap with some 
challenges from the literature and some were new. Many of 
the new challenges elicited in this study (C18-C21) were also 
found in the study we did previously of EoP and of Protection 
Poker in a capstone project, thus they are likely not specific 
for the company we studied (see Table 5 for an overview of 
findings from that study that are relevant to the challenges we 
have identified in this study).  
When mapping the challenges to the agile manifesto (Table 
4), we can see that our study showed challenges mostly 
influenced by the focus on “individuals and interactions over 
processes and tools” and on “working software over 
comprehensive documentation”. One of the reasons for this in 
our study is that we focused on the meetings, and the 
challenges we had on running the meetings.  
Table 2 - Mapping of Challenges from Gálvezand Gürses [25]. 
Challenges from Gálvezand Gürses [25] Our 
Study 
G1: Up to date model Ö 
G2: Vague requirements descriptions Ö 
G3: Modular diagram Ö 
G4: Reflect implementation details into the system 
diagram 
Ö 
G5: Keep the threat list up to date Ö 
G6: Threats can emerge, change or vanish as the system 
evolves 
 
G7: Requirements elicitation from customers is slow  
G8: Customers may not possess enough privacy 
knowledge 
 
G9: The attacker perspective may not lead to realistic 
threats 
 
G10: Bringing experts into the development process 
slows it down  
X 
G11: Business goals are difficult to translate to privacy 
requirements  
 
G12: Threat catalogs are limited Ö 
G13: Deriving threats is slow Ö 
G14: Analyzing scenarios requires a lot of creativity  
G15: Performing risk assessment is slow Ö 
G16: Finding cascade failures from combinations of 
services is difficult  
Ö 
G17: Strategic mitigations are difficult to spot in an 
evolving system 
 
G18: Conflicting privacy requirements for the same 
Service 
 
G19: No common infrastructure to enforce rules across 
different services 
 
G20: Lack of information to automate testing  
G21: Manual validation requires expertise and 
documentation 
 
Table 3 - Mapping of Challenges from Tuma et al. [2]. 
Challenges from Tuma et al. [2] Our 
Study 
T1: Automated Threat Analysis Ö 
T2: Propagation to the Source Code Ö 
T3: Need Guidelines for Composition Analysis.  Ö 
T4: Need Guidelines for Definition of Done Ö 
Table 4 – Mapping the Agile Manifesto Principles to the Challenges.   
Agile Manifesto Tuma et 
al. [2] 
Gálvezand 
Gürses [25] 
Our Study 
Individuals and 
interactions over 
processes and tools 
 G3 C9, C10, 
C12, C14, 
C16 
Working software 
over comprehensive 
documentation 
T2 
 
G2,G3, G4, 
G20, G21 
C1, C3, 
C4, C5, 
C6, C7,C8, 
C11, C19, 
C20 
Customer 
collaboration over 
contract negotiation 
 G7, G8, G9, 
G10, G11 
 
Responding to 
change over 
following a plan 
T1, T2, 
T4 
G1, G6, G5, 
G15, G16, 
G17, G18, 
G19 
C8, C13 
  
Table 5 – Challenges also observed in our previous studies  in a study 
of Protection Poker [4] and Microsoft EoP [26] with University 
Capstone Projects.  
Selected challenges from Tøndel et al.  [4], [26] Our 
Study 
Asset value was mixed up with exposure of feature in 
the discussions 
C2 
Students did not use the details of the DFD in the 
discussions. 
C4 
Students played EoP early in the project, and it was 
unclear how the design and code would be.  
C7 
Students ended up having varying preferences on 
whether to do threat modeling as a game or as a 
checklist. 
C9 
Students did not play the full EoP card deck, but 
students considered themselves finished anyway. 
C13, 
C14 
The security expert was essential to understand the 
threats (hints on the cards) and how they apply to the 
system. 
C15 
No vibrant discussions due to limited security 
knowledge. Some were more knowledgeable and 
more active than others. 
C16 
Many of the existing cards were not considered 
relevant. 
C17 
Score sheets ended up having few details. It was not 
clear to the students what to do with the results 
after the EoP session.The students wanted more 
support on mitigations actions. No impact on 
the design and implementation choices were 
observed. 
C18 
Results from the sessions were not followed up  C19 
Some groups were instructed by  customers to drop 
the security considerations in order to prioritise 
functionality. 
C20 
Playing parts of the deck and not finding much of 
relevance made them reluctant to look at the 
remaining threats. 
C21 
 
Individuals and interactions over processes and tools was 
challenging specially because it was hard to get effective 
meetings with clear and actionable outputs and because in 
some teams they were in a distributed setting which made the 
meetings even harder to run. We also see a need for better 
guidelines on how to run the meetings. In our previous paper 
on running EoP (Elevation of Privilege) with teams of 
students, we have found that there are many problems with 
running the threat modeling meetings using EoP [4]. 
Therefore more studies needs to be done in order to 
understand what is the best process to run these meetings in 
an agile context. We can see with the challenges that there are 
needs for guidelines on what to document, which level of 
details the diagrams need to have, how to structure the meeting 
to be motivating and effective and how to document and 
follow up the output of the meetings.  
The focus on working software over comprehensive 
documentation is a challenge for security work, as, it is many 
times very much based on the documentation of the decisions, 
risks and assets. We have yet not found very good arguments 
to motivate the teams and show them the advantages of having 
all this extra documentation done.  
Gálvez and Gürses [25] have found six challenges on the 
principle of customer collaboration, but we have not observed 
these. In our case we did not experience these challenges 
because the context of when we had the threat modelling was 
during maintenance phase of the products, and the focus of the 
threat modelling activity was on the product and not on the 
specific projects. We have tried to have the Product Owners 
in some meetings, and this was mostly beneficial rather than 
challenging, especially because it created more awareness of 
the threats, and also because they could understand more of 
the impacts and exploitability of the threats. As future work 
we will also have meetings in contexts of the projects and 
involve the customers in the discussions.  
On the principle of responding to change over following a 
plan, we have found two challenges related to the maintenance 
of the DFDs, and the question of deciding when enough 
analysis has been done. Tuma et al. [2] have also identified this 
problem and propose that a “definition of done” needs to be 
further explored for activities in threat analysis. 
 Further research should address the benefits of having 
security documentation in agile projects. One way to address 
this is to focus on the insights provided by Tuma et al. . [2] that 
existing analysis techniques have yet to mature in traceability 
of analysis in the code base, composability of analysis 
outcomes and threat impact analysis automation;. 
B. Implications to Practice of Threat Modelling with 
Microsoft STRIDE and DFDs. 
On the implications to the practice, we observed in this 
study that there are many improvement points on the approach 
for threat modelling using DFDs and STRIDE. Companies 
must be aware of these and apply the technique accordingly.  
One recommendation to the practitioners is to include a 
security expert for facilitating the meeting, helping the 
meeting to be more focused, and also more relevant to the 
participants. As we mentioned before, this company has 
adopted the role of Security Champions in each team, and they 
were very important players in the whole process; they were 
the ones driving the drawing of the DFDs, scheduling the 
meetings, documenting the threats found and creating and 
following up the risks identified in the meetings. Clearly, they 
need to be “coached/trained” to build the skills needed to 
perform these activities, and our role as researchers doing 
action research with them, influenced this process and helped 
them to get the needed skills.  
The observations shown in this study also lead us to affirm 
that  that any extra activity that is performed to address 
security concerns, will potentially slow down the process of 
creating functionality, and if the developers are only 
considering the features output, without being concerned 
about the quality of these features we may be able to say that 
performing threat modeling may slow down the development 
process, still we would say that the company in this study see 
the benefits of keeping the practice and will keep adding the 
activity as part of the regular and systematic approach to 
security. 
There is also a need to be better on making clear to the 
teams about the benefits of doing threat modeling for the 
project, while acknowledging the possible impacts in time and 
costs, not only for the meetings themselves, but also on the 
time needed for preparation of the meetings  and follow-up of 
the outputs of the meetings. In addition, the side effects of the 
activity should be highlighted, such as: better documentation 
of the system, awareness of security issues for all team 
members, better confidence on the way security is addressed 
in the team, and better visibility of the threats to other 
stakeholders such as Product Owners and possibly managers 
  
and executives. 
We also noticed a decrease of motivation from the asset 
identification to the threat modeling meeting. One hypothesis 
we have is that the first meeting on the assets created more 
awareness, and they were excited to learn something new; the 
threat anslysis meeting focused more on trying to document 
the threats, and it was not as engaging. 
VI. LIMITATIONS 
In any action research study, the role of the participating 
researchers may have a significant influence on the result. In 
our case, we believe that since there was little software 
security expertise present in the organization under study, it is 
likely that it might not even have attempted to conduct any 
threat modeling exercises without us. We will maintain our 
collaboration with this organization in the years to come, in 
order to learn whether the threat modeling activities that we 
have initiated can become self-sustaining.  
Our participation in the process may have also influenced 
the results in the sense that it is possible that either we have 
not found all challenges that other companies are facing, or we 
have introduced challenges by our participation in the process. 
The participant observer role of the researchers has been more 
active than the usual case, since we facilitated the meetings 
and also assisted the Security Champion in the role of a 
security expert. However, we believe that in the long run, the 
security champions at the studied company will acquire 
enough security modeling expertise for performing this 
activity with the team. Not every developer can be a security 
expert, but every software development organization needs to 
have enough expertise to conduct most of the software 
security activities in the development lifecycle.  
Common criticisms to a case study also apply to this study, 
among them one may list: uniqueness, difficulty to generalize 
the results, and the introduction of bias by participants and 
researchers [30]. In our study, we generalized the findings 
from empirical findings to theoretical statements, which 
involved generalizing data from collected data and 
perceptions by discussing them in accordance with the 
literature. Observation data were our primary source of 
information, and therefore they have the limitations of the 
possible research bias.  
Qualitative findings are highly context- and case-
dependent, and this is also true for our study. We sought to 
mitigate this by analyzing activities in five product teams. All 
the participants were professionals using typical development 
technologies in a typical working environment, e.g., the 
natural setting demanded by the case study approach. We 
described the main characteristics of the case study, including 
context and settings, data collection, and analysis process. We 
believe that this makes the results easier to generalize. 
As commonly done in in-depth qualitative studies, we also 
had to do a trade-off between the number of participants, the 
duration and the cost of this study. The number of projects and 
variance in the context is not quantitatively significant, but 
gives deeper insights on the issues investigated in this work.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Introducing software security activities in an agile 
development lifecycle does not come for free; by necessity, 
extra activities require extra time and effort. The research 
results presented in this paper contribute to the body of 
knowledge in applying security activities in the agile context. 
Challenges were described related to the different principles 
of agile. 
Some challenges overlap the findings from the literature 
and the extra challenges we have found in our exploratory 
study came mostly from the activities of asset identification 
and also from our observations on what happened after the 
threat modeling meetings.  
We have also identified some lessons learned for 
companies that wish to perform threat modelling using the 
Microsoft Threat Modelling approach.  
This study shows that we still have to address many 
challenges in order to get a proper adoption of threat modeling 
in agile development projects. Therefore, as future work, our 
goal is to better understand the challenges here elicited, and 
validate our findings in different contexts and organizations 
we are collaborating with in the current project.  
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